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Exploiting Physical-Layer Security for Multiuser
Multicarrier Computation Offloading
Jie Xu and Jianping Yao
Abstract—This letter considers a mobile edge computing
(MEC) system with one access point (AP) serving multiple users
over a multicarrier channel, in the presence of a malicious
eavesdropper. In this system, each user can execute the respective
computation tasks by partitioning them into two parts, which are
computed locally and offloaded to AP, respectively. We exploit
the physical-layer security to secure the multiuser computation
offloading from being overheard by the eavesdropper. Under this
setup, we minimize the weighted sum-energy consumption for
these users, subject to the newly imposed secrecy offloading rate
constraints and the computation latency constraints, by jointly
optimizing their computation and communication resource allo-
cations. We propose an efficient algorithm to solve this problem.
Index Terms—Mobile edge computing (MEC), multiuser com-
putation offloading, physical-layer security, optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile edge computing (MEC) has emerged as a promising
technique to enhance the computation capacity and energy ef-
ficiency of wireless devices, for enabling various computation-
intensive and latency-critical Internet-of-things (IoT) applica-
tions [1]. By deploying MEC servers at the network edge such
as access points (APs), IoT devices can wirelessly offload the
computation-heavy tasks to APs for efficient remote execution
(see, e.g., [2]–[6]). Despite the benefits, the wireless task
offloading introduces new data security problems for wireless
IoT devices. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless commu-
nications, the computation tasks offloaded from these devices
are likely to be overheard by malicious attackers nearby, which
may decode such information for launching security attacks.
For the success of MEC, it is crucial to keep the confidentiality
of the task offloading against eavesdropping attacks.
Physical-layer security has emerged as a viable solution
to ensure perfectly secured wireless communications against
eavesdropping attacks, provided that (partial) channel state
information (CSI) of the eavesdroppers is available at the
legitimate users (see, e.g., [7]–[9]). In physical-layer security,
the key design objective is to maximize the so-called secrecy
rate, i.e., the secure communication rate under the condition
that the eavesdroppers cannot overhear any information.
In this letter, we propose to employ the physical-layer
security to secure the wireless computation offloading in MEC.
We particularly focus on a multiuser multicarrier (e.g., orthog-
onal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA)) system as
shown in Fig. 1, in which a single AP (with an MEC server
integrated) serves multiple users for their computation offload-
ing, in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper. Each user
can partition the computation tasks into two parts, which are
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Fig. 1. The MEC system model with secure multiuser computation offloading
over a multicarrier channel, in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper.
computed locally and securely offloaded to AP, respectively.
Due to the employment of physical-layer security, new secure
offloading constraints are imposed, i.e., the offloading rate at
each user cannot exceed its secrecy rate to the AP, such that no
information will be leaked to the eavesdropper. By taking into
account such constraints and considering practical issues such
as the imperfect CSI of the eavesdropper, how to jointly opti-
mize the communication and computation resource allocations
at multiple users for efficient MEC is a new problem that has
not been investigated in the literature yet. Under this setup,
we minimize the weighted sum-energy consumption for these
users while ensuring their computation latency requirements,
by jointly optimizing the users’ local computing, as well
as their transmit power and subcarrier allocations for secure
offloading. Although this problem is non-convex, we obtain
its solution in a semi-closed form via the Lagrange duality
method. Via numerical results, we validate the effectiveness
of our proposed design over other benchmark schemes. We
also show that as compared to the conventional setup without
eavesdropper, the users consume more energy to secure the
computation offloading from the eavesdropper’s interception.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider an MEC system with
a single AP (with an MEC server integrated) and K > 1
users, in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper.1 Let K ,
{1, . . . ,K} denote the set of users. All nodes are equipped
with a single antenna. We focus on a particular time block with
duration T , during which each user k ∈ K needs to execute the
computation tasks with Lk > 0 input bits. We consider the data
partition task model for partial offloading, in which each task-
input bit can be viewed as an independent sub-task. Therefore,
user k can partition the respective tasks into two portions with
lk and (Lk− lk) input bits, which are locally computed at the
user itself and securely offloaded to the AP over a multicarrier
1Our results are extendible to the case with more than one eavesdropper, in
which each user’s achievable secrecy rate for offloading should be modified
based on that in the so-called compound wire-tap channels with multiple
eavesdroppers (see, e.g., [10]).
2channel for remote execution, respectively. We consider a
quasi-static subcarrier channel model, in which the wireless
channels remain constant over each subcarrier within this
block. Let N denote the number of subcarriers in this system.
For each subcarrier n ∈ N , {1, . . . , N}, let hk,n and g˜k,n
denote the channel power gains from user k to the AP and the
eavesdropper, respectively. We assume that the AP perfectly
knows the CSI of hk,n’s and the computation information of all
users, but only partially knows that of g˜k,n’s.
2 As commonly
adopted in the physical-layer security literature [12]–[14], we
consider the deterministic CSI uncertainty model for g˜k,n’s,
where g˜k,n = gk,n+∆gk,n, k ∈ K, n ∈ N . Here, gk,n denotes
the estimated CSI of g˜k,n at the AP and ∆gk,n denotes the
estimation error that is bounded by a possible value ǫ ≥ 0
(also know by the AP) as |∆gk,n| ≤ ǫ.
As for the local computing of the lk input bits at each user
k ∈ K, let Ck denote the number of CPU cycles required for
computing one task-input bit (or each independent sub-task).
Accordingly, the total number of CPU cycles required for
computing the lk bits is Cklk. Employing the dynamic voltage
and frequency scaling technique [1], [2], user k can control
the CPU frequency fk,m for each cycle m ∈ {1, . . . , Cklk}.
In particular, in order to minimize the energy consumption for
local computing at each user k, the CPU frequencies fk,m’s
should be identical over different cyclesm’s [4]. By using this
fact and noting that the local execution time should be T to
meet the computation latency, we have the CPU frequencies
at each user k as fk,m = Cklk/T, ∀m ∈ {1, . . . , Cklk}.
Therefore, the user k’s energy consumption for local com-
puting is given by Elock =
∑Cklk
m=1 ζkf
2
k,m = ζkC
3
k l
3
k/T
2,
where ζk denotes the effective capacitance coefficient that
depends on the chip architecture at user k [1]. Furthermore,
let fmaxk denote the maximum CPU frequency at each user k;
we have fk,m ≤ fmaxk , ∀k,m. Accordingly, it must hold that
lk ≤ lmaxk , f
max
k T/Ck, ∀k ∈ K.
Next, we consider the secure offloading of the (Lk − lk)
task input bits for each user k ∈ K.3 Let {θk,n} denote the
indicators for subcarrier allocation with θk,n ∈ {0, 1}, where
θk,n = 1 or θk,n = 0 mean that the sub-carrier n ∈ N is or
is not allocated to user k, respectively. Let pk,n ≥ 0 denote
the transmit power at user k for secure task offloading, and B
the bandwidth of each subcarrier. Under the CSI uncertainty
model, the worst-case achievable secrecy rate (in bits/sec) at
user k for offloading is given as
Rk(θk,pk) = min
|∆gk,n|≤ǫ
B
N∑
n=1
θk,n
(
log2
(
1 + hk,npk,n
)
− log2
(
1 + g˜k,npk,n
))+
2When the eavesdropper is active, each user k can monitor the eaves-
dropper’s potential active transmission to estimate the corresponding g˜k,n’s.
When the eavesdropper is passive without transmitting any signal, each user
k can still detect the passive eavesdropping, by e.g. from the eavesdropper’s
local oscillator power leaked from its RF front end [11]. For both cases, the
users can eventually obtain some information of g˜k,n’s and then send such
information back to the AP. In this case, the AP can partially know g˜k,n’s
with some errors.
3Note that the MEC server and the AP generally have large computation
capability and transmission power, respectively. Therefore, we ignore the time
required for remote computation at the MEC server and computation results
downloading from the AP to the users (see, e.g., [4]–[6]).
= B
N∑
n=1
θk,n
(
log2
(
1 + hk,npk,n
)
− log2
(
1 + gk,npk,n
))+
,
where gk,n = gk,n+ǫ denotes the best possible channel power
gain of the eavesdropper known by the AP. Here, the receiver
noise powers at the AP and the eavesdropper are normalized
to be unity, (x)+ , max(x, 0), θk , [θk,1, . . . , θk,N ]
†, and
pk , [pk,1, . . . , pk,N ]
†, with the superscript † denoting the
transpose. The user k’s transmission energy consumption for
secure offloading is given as Eoffk =
∑N
n=1 θk,npk,nT .
Under this setup, our objective is to minimize the weighted
sum-energy consumption at theK users (i.e.,
∑K
k=1 αk(E
loc
k +
Eoffk )) while ensuring the successful computation task execu-
tion within this block. Here, αk > 0 denotes the energy weight
for each user k ∈ K, where a larger value of αk indicates
a higher priority for user k in energy minimization. The
decision variables include the task partition l , [l1, . . . , lK ]
†,
as well as the subcarrier allocation Θ , [θ1, . . . , θK ] and the
power allocation P , [p1, . . . ,pK ] for secure task offloading.
Mathematically, this problem is formulated as
(P1) : min
l,Θ,P
K∑
k=1
αk
(
ζkC
3
k l
3
k/T
2 +
N∑
n=1
θk,npk,nT
)
s.t. TRk(θk,pk) ≥ Lk − lk, ∀k ∈ K (1)
0 ≤ lk ≤ l
max
k , pk,n ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ N (2)
K∑
k=1
θk,n = 1, θk,n ∈ {0, 1}, ∀n ∈ N , (3)
Notice that in (1), the worst-case secrecy rate for each user
k must be no smaller than the offloading rate, such that
the offloading is secured under any possible eavesdropper
channels. Furthermore, the constraints in (3) ensure that each
subcarrier is only allocated to one user. However, due to
the binary variables in Θ, problem (P1) is a non-convex
optimization problem that is generally difficult to solve.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that in the special
case without the eavesdropper (or equivalently gk,n = 0, ∀k ∈
K, n ∈ N ), problem (P1) corresponds to the energy-efficient
multiuser computation offloading problem over multicarrier
systems in [6]. In the other special case with only offloading
(or equivalently lk = 0, ∀k ∈ K), problem (P1) corresponds to
a secrecy communication problem over a multicarrier channel
(see, e.g., [9]). Therefore, problem (P1) unifies the conven-
tional computation offloading design in MEC and the energy
efficient communication with physical-layer security.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO PROBLEM (P1)
Though non-convex, it can be shown that problem (P1)
satisfies the time-sharing condition in [15], as the number of
subcarriers N becomes infinite. In this case, zero duality gap
or strong duality holds between (P1) and its Lagrange dual
problem. In this section, we solve problem (P1) by using the
Lagrange dual method, by considering the zero duality gap.4
Let λk ≥ 0, k ∈ K, denote the dual variable associated with
the k-th constraint in (1). The Lagrangian of (P1) is given as
4In our simulations in Section IV with N = 64 subcarriers, the duality gap
of (P1) is actually negligibly small and thus can be ignored. Moreover, the
duality gap reduces as N increases, and approaches zero for N →∞ [15].
3L(l,Θ,P ,λ) =
K∑
k=1
αk
(
ζkC
3
k l
3
k/T
2 +
N∑
n=1
θk,npk,nT
)
(4)
−
K∑
k=1
λk
(
TB
N∑
n=1
θk,n
(
log2
1 + hk,npk,n
1 + gk,npk,n
)+
− (Lk − lk)
)
.
The dual function is given by
f(λ) = min
l,Θ,P
L(l,Θ,P ,λ), s.t. (2) and (3). (5)
The dual problem is
(D1) : max
λ
f(λ), s.t. λk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K. (6)
In the following, we solve problem (P1) by first solving
problem (5) to obtain f(λ) under any given λ satisfying (6),
and then solving (D1) via updating λ to maximize f(λ).
First, consider problem (5) under any given λ satisfying (6).
In this case, problem (5) can be decomposed into the following
subproblems by dropping the irrelevant constant
∑K
k=1 λkLk.
min
0≤lk≤lmaxk
αkζkC
3
k l
3
k/T
2 − λklk, (7)
min
{θk,n,pk,n}Kk=1
K∑
k=1
αkθk,npk,nT −
K∑
k=1
λkθk,nTB
×
(
log2
(
1 + hk,npk,n
)
− log2
(
1 + gk,npk,n
))+
s.t. pk,n ≥ 0, θk,n ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k ∈ K,
K∑
k=1
θk,n = 1, (8)
where each subproblem (7) corresponds to one user k, and
each subproblem (8) corresponds to one subcarrier n.
For the kth subproblem in (7), by checking the first-order
derivative, the optimal solution is given by
l
(λ)
k = min
(√
λkT 2
3αkζkC3k
, lmaxk
)
. (9)
For the nth subproblem in (8), it is evident that only one
user can be active due to the constraint
∑K
k=1 θk,n = 1, i.e.,
there exists exactly one user k such that θk,n = 1 and θkˆ,n =
0, ∀kˆ 6= k. As a result, we can optimally solve this problem by
solving for {pk,n}Kk=1 under each possible {θk,n}
K
k=1, and then
comparing the resultant objective values to find the optimal
{θk,n}Kk=1. When user k is active (i.e., θk,n = 1 and θkˆ,n =
0, ∀kˆ 6= k), we define the objective function of problem (8) as
ψk,n(pk,n) , αkpk,nT − λkTB
(
log2
1 + hk,npk,n
1 + gk,npk,n
)+
.
Then we have the following lemma to solve problem (8).
Lemma 3.1: For the nth subproblem in (8) under given λ,
the optimal power allocation solution is given as
p
(λ)
k,n =


0, if hk,n ≤ gk,n(
λkB
ln 2αk
− 1
hk,n
)+
if gk,n = 0(√
∆
(λ)
k,n
−(hk,n+gk,n)
2hk,ngk,n
)+
otherwise,
(10)
∀k ∈ K, where
∆
(λ)
k,n = (hk,n − gk,n)
2 +
4λkBhk,ngk,n
ln 2αk
(hk,n − gk,n).
In this case, the index of the active user is
k(λ)n = argmin
k∈K
ψk,n(p
(λ)
k,n ), (11)
and accordingly, the subcarrier allocation is given as
θ
(λ)
k,n =
{
1, if k = k
(λ)
n
0, otherwise
, ∀k ∈ K. (12)
Proof: Suppose that user k is active with θk,n = 1
and θ
kˆ,n
= 0, ∀kˆ 6= k, problem (8) is reexpressed as
minpk,n≥0 ψk,n(pk,n). When hk,n ≤ gk,n, we have log2(1 +
hk,npk,n) − log2(1 + gk,npk,n) ≤ 0 under any pk,n ≥ 0,
and therefore, it follows that p
(λ)
k,n = 0 in this case. When
hk,n > gk,n, this problem is indeed convex. By checking the
first-order derivative of ψk,n(pk,n) in this case, we have p
(λ)
k,n
in (10). As a result, the optimal objective value of problem (8)
in the case with the user k being active is given as ψk,n(p
(λ)
k,n ).
By comparing ψk,n(p
(λ)
k,n )’s under different k’s, the optimal
k
(λ)
n and θ
(λ)
k,n can be obtained in (11) and (12), respectively.
By combining l
(λ)
k ’s in (9) as well as θ
(λ)
k,n ’s and p
(λ)
k,n ’s in
Lemma 3.1, the dual function f(λ) in (5) is obtained.
Next, it remains to solve problem (D1). As the dual problem
(D1) is always convex but generally non-differentiable, we can
use subgradient-based methods such as the ellipsoid method
to solve (D1) optimally, by using the fact that the subgradient
of f(λ) with respect to λk is (Lk− l
(λ)
k )−TRk(θ
(λ)
k ,p
(λ)
k ).
We denote λ∗ = [λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
K ]
† as the optimal dual solution
to (D1).
Finally, based on the optimal λ∗ to (D1), we have the
following proposition to solve (P1).
Proposition 3.1: The solution to problem (P1) is given as
l∗k = l
(λ
∗
)
k , p
∗
k,n = p
(λ
∗
)
k,n , and θ
∗
k,n = θ
(λ
∗
)
k,n , ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ N ,
where l
(λ)
k ’s, p
(λ)
k,n ’s, and θ
(λ)
k,n ’s are given in (9), (10), and
(12), respectively.
Remark 3.1: Proposition 3.1 generalizes the resource allo-
cation for the computation offloading in MEC and that for
the physical-layer security (see, e.g., [9]) over multicarrier
systems. First, when gk,n = 0, ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ N , a water-
filling-like power allocation is observed in (10) for each user.
This corresponds to the energy efficient multiuser computation
offloading design without eavesdropper (see, e.g., [6]). Next, it
is observed that the optimal power and subcarrier allocations
in (10) and (12) have similar structures as those for the secrecy
communication over a multicarrier channel in [9], while the
difference lies in the determination of the dual variable λ∗,
which controls the energy consumption tradeoff between the
local computing and secure offloading in our consideration.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to validate
the performance of our proposed design as compared to
two benchmark schemes, as well as the conventional design
without eavesdropper that servers as a performance upper
bound (or energy lower bound).
1) Secure full offloading: All the K users choose to offload
all the task input bits to the AP. In this case, the weighted sum-
energy minimization corresponds to solving problem (P1) by
setting lk = 0, ∀k ∈ K.
2) Local computing: All the K users locally compute
all the computation tasks, i.e., lk = Lk, ∀k ∈ K.
The weighted sum-energy consumption by the K users is∑K
k=1 αkζkC
3
kL
3
k/T
2.
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Fig. 2. Average energy consumption at the users versus the number of
computation input bits L at each user.
3) Conventional design without eavesdropper: The
weighted sum-energy minimization corresponds to solving
problem (P1) by setting gk,n = 0, ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ N .
In the simulation, we consider a multicarrier system with
N = 64 subcarriers and K = 4 users. We consider the
Rayleigh fading channel model for hk,n’s and gk,n’s, and
assume that the average channel power gains follow the
pathloss model β0(d/d0)
−ξ, where d denotes the distance
between the respective nodes, β0 = −30 dB corresponds to
the pathloss at a reference distance of d0 = 1 meter (m),
and ξ = 3.7 corresponds to the pathloss exponent. We set
ζk = 10
−28 Joule (J)/cycle, Ck = 10
3 cycles/bit, B = 0.3125
MHz, the noise power spectrum density to be −105 dBm/Hz,
and ǫ to be 10% of the corresponding pathloss. We also set
αk = 1/K, ∀k ∈ K, and thus we consider the average energy
consumption at the K users as the performance metric. We
also consider Lk = L, ∀k ∈ K, and set the distances from the
K users to the AP to be identical as 20 meters.
Fig. 2 shows the average energy consumption of theK users
versus the number of computation input bits L at each user,
in which the distances from the K users to the eavesdropper
are all 20 meters. It is observed that when L is small (e.g.,
L ≤ 3× 105 bits), the proposed design, the local computing,
and the conventional design without eavesdropper achieve
similar energy consumption performance, and outperform the
secure full offloading. This is because in this case, the local
computing is sufficient to handle the computation tasks. By
contrast, when L becomes large (e.g., L ≥ 4 × 105 bits),
the proposed design is observed to outperform the secure full
offloading and local computing. This shows the importance of
joint optimization of local computing and secure offloading.
In this case, the proposed design is also observed to consume
more energy than the conventional design without eavesdrop-
per, for the purpose of anti-eavesdropping.
Fig. 3 shows the average energy consumption of the K
users versus the identical distance from the users to the
eavesdropper, in which we set L = 7×105 bits. It is observed
that as the distance increases, the energy consumption for
secure offloading decreases, as the wireless channels to the
eavesdropper become weaker. More specifically, the proposed
design is observed to have a similar performance as the
conventional design without eavesdropper, when the distance
is larger than 30 m.
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Fig. 3. Average energy consumption at the users versus the distance from
the users to the eavesdropper.
V. CONCLUSION
This letter proposed to use physical layer security to ensure
the computation task offloading in MEC systems. By focusing
on a multiuser multicarrier system, we studied a latency-
constrained weighted sum-energy minimization problem via
jointly optimizing the local computing and secure offloading.
How to extend the secure computation offloading to other
MEC setups with, e.g., multiple APs and multiple antennas
is interesting future directions worth investigating.
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